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LEGITIMIZING ERROR
Rebecca E. Woodman * †
Since Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court has sought to harmonize
competing constitutional demands under Eighth Amendment rules regulating the two-step eligibility and selection stages of the capital decisionmaking process. Furman’s demand for rationality and consistency requires
that, at the eligibility stage, the sentencer’s discretion be limited and guided
by clear and objective fact-based standards that rationally narrow the class
of death-eligible defendants. The selection stage requires a determination of
whether a specific death-eligible defendant actually deserves that punishment, as distinguished from other death-eligible defendants. Here,
fundamental fairness and respect for the uniqueness of the individual are the
cornerstones of the individualized sentencing requirements, which demand
the sentencer consider and give effect to relevant mitigating evidence. The
principles embodied in the individualized sentencing determination, as
stated in Lockett v. Ohio, are rooted in the “fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment.” In Woodson v. North Carolina, the
Court recognized that, because “death is different” from all other punishments, the Eighth Amendment requires a heightened degree of “reliability in
the determination that death is an appropriate punishment in a specific
case.”
Though both constitutional demands are aimed at ensuring that state
capital-sentencing procedures comply with Furman’s demand to eliminate
the wanton and freakish infliction of the death penalty, there is an unmistakable—and oft-discussed—tension between them. While the demand for
rationality and reliability at the eligibility stage places limits on the sentencer’s discretion, the demand for fairness and respect for the individual at
the selection stage requires an expanded discretion and the authority to dispense mercy based on mitigating evidence.
The Court’s efforts to balance these demands have been difficult. Justice
Blackmun, in his famous dissent in Callins v. Collins, withdrew from the
effort altogether, and announced that he would no longer “tinker with the
machinery of death.” Justice Scalia, responding to Justice Blackmun in his
concurrence in Callins, took another tack, and repeated his announcement
four years earlier in Walton v. Arizona, that he would not enforce the requirements of the individualized sentencing determination because, in his
view, there was no basis for it in the text of the Eighth Amendment. Justice
Scalia reiterated that position in his concurring opinion in Kansas v. Marsh.
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But the rules regulating the capital decision-making process—
particularly those governing the individualized sentencing determination—
are designed to minimize the risk of error in sentencing a person to death.
Thus, despite the natural tension between the competing constitutional demands at the eligibility and selection stages, the Court (except for Justice
Scalia) has remained faithful to the effort to harmonize them, at least in
form, if not always in substance. Until now.
I always thought that if there ever was a capital sentencing formula in
which the constitutional demands of individualized sentencing could not be
met, even in form, the Kansas statutory formula was it. How could a statutory scheme requiring death if the jury finds that the aggravating and
mitigating factors are in equipoise possibly ensure a reliable determination
that death is an appropriate punishment for an individual offender? Even if
the jury’s finding of equipoise is beyond a reasonable doubt, the resulting
death sentence does not fulfill the requirements for individualized sentencing. Equipoise indicates only that the jury is unable to reach a conclusion
whether the balance of aggravation and mitigation does or does not make
the individual defendant worthy of death. A death sentence based on equipoise says nothing about a particular individual except that he or she is
among the class of death-eligible defendants. The decision constitutionally
required by the jury at the selection stage is left unfulfilled.
At the outset, the Court’s treatment of the merits is puzzling, even apart
from the well-publicized fireworks it sparked between Justice Scalia and
Justice Souter. If—as the majority in Marsh contends—Walton v. Arizona is
controlling authority on the constitutionality of the Kansas statute, why
didn’t the Court just reverse based on Walton and be done with it? But Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, hedges on Walton’s dispositive effect,
and is compelled to justify the decision as if “Walton [did] not directly control.” Whether this indicates a lack of confidence in Walton’s real value as
stare decisis in this case remains unexplained.
I have never believed Walton to be controlling on the equipoise issue. As
both Justice Stevens and Justice Souter separately point out in Marsh, the
Walton plurality never addressed the equipoise issue, and certainly avoided
endorsing a rule which would require death if the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are equally balanced. (In fact, Arizona law requires that
“doubtful cases” will be resolved in favor of life; the precise opposite of the
Kansas law.) Justice Blackmun, who truly believed that the Arizona law did
present an equipoise problem, wrote extensively in his dissent in Walton to
point out that the plurality did not address the issue. The Marsh majority’s
reliance on Justice Blackmun’s dissent as a basis for asserting that the equipoise issue was “resolved” by the plurality’s holding in Walton, therefore, is
tenuous.
Justice Thomas concludes for the majority that the Kansas statute contains the structural form of both narrowing and individualized sentencing.
We never disputed that the Kansas statute satisfies the Eighth Amendment
narrowing requirement at the eligibility stage, since the jury must find the
existence of at least one aggravating factor before a defendant becomes
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death-eligible. Justice Thomas then suggests that the Kansas procedure conforms to the individualized sentencing requirement because “a Kansas jury
is permitted to consider any evidence relating to any mitigating circumstance in determining the appropriate sentence for a capital defendant, so
long as that evidence is relevant.”
It is here that the majority opinion becomes most interesting. As we argued, and as Justice Souter’s dissent makes clear, confining individualized
sentencing to a mere requirement that a jury be allowed to consider relevant
mitigating evidence falls short of the demand of constitutional reliability set
forth in the Court’s own precedents. Justice Thomas acknowledges the incongruity by dismissing it.
For example, in answering Justice Souter’s claim that the Kansas equipoise provision increases the risk of error in capital sentencing, Justice
Thomas asserts in a footnote that the jury instruction allowing consideration
of “mercy” as a mitigating factor “alone forecloses the possibility of
Furman-type error” by eliminating such risk. In making the assertion, however, Justice Thomas second-guesses the Kansas Supreme Court’s
interpretation of how its own capital-sentencing formula operates, and in
doing so, mischaracterizes the instruction.
In its earlier decision of State v. Kleypas, the Kansas Supreme Court authoritatively interpreted the statutory equipoise formula as mandating death
in “doubtful cases,” i.e., where the jury concludes that the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances are in equipoise. Applying constitutional principles under the Eighth Amendment, the Kansas court concluded that the
statute violated the demands of individualized sentencing. The Kleypas
holding was reiterated by the Kansas Supreme Court in its decision in
Marsh.
It was settled long ago, in cases like Winters v. New York and Poulos v.
New Hampshire, that the Supreme Court has a duty, under principles of federalism, to accept the interpretation of a state statute by the state’s highest
court. Yet, the only interpretation of the Kansas formula under which Justice
Thomas’s assertion has any validity is one that assumes a Kansas jury is
given the discretion and authority to dispense mercy after finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances in equipoise. Only then would the jury be
asked to make an individualized determination whether to impose death.
But, as interpreted by the Kansas Supreme Court, the Kansas formula ends
with the weighing process. If the jury is in equipoise after considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the sentence must be death. By
interpreting the Kansas formula differently than the Kansas Supreme Court,
Justice Thomas mischaracterizes the mercy instruction. The only way a jury
could dispense mercy under the Kansas instruction is by refusing to follow
it.
The Marsh majority opinion further justifies the Kansas statute as “analytically indistinguishable” from the capital sentencing structures approved
by the Court in Blystone v. Pennsylvania and Boyde v. California. Both
cases involved formulas that mandate death upon a jury finding that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. In response to
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Justice Souter’s argument—the fact that aggravators must predominate under those systems was crucial to finding them constitutional—Justice
Thomas (again, in a footnote) merely states that both Boyde and Blystone
turned on the idea that the formulas were not “impermissibly mandatory.”
But under any analysis, a structure mandating death when the jury’s reasons
for favoring death are actually greater than the reasons for sparing a defendant’s life is materially different from the Kansas structure of, “If it’s a tie,
you must die.” The majority does not answer.
As Justice Souter reminds us, constitutional reliability under the Eighth
Amendment “demands both form and substance, both a system for decision
and one geared to produce morally justifiable results.” A death sentence can
only be “morally justifiable” if, as the Eighth Amendment requires, the decision to impose death constitutes a “reasoned moral response,” which turns
on the uniqueness of the individual and the details of the crime, and identifies the defendant as one whose extreme culpability makes him or her
particularly deserving of death. Kansas’s “tie breaker” in favor of death,
Justice Souter explains, does none of these things. It does the opposite, because the determining fact—a finding of equipoise—is not directly linked to
a particular crime or criminal, and reflects no evidentiary showing that death
must be the reasoned moral response. Rather than minimize the risk of an
erroneous death sentence as the Eighth Amendment demands, the Kansas
statute “guarantee[s] that in equipoise cases the risk will be realized.”
Justice Thomas maintains that it is simply “implausible” that an equipoise determination reflects an inability of the jury to decide between life
and death, or that a Kansas jury would impose death by equipoise without
making the constitutionally requisite “reasoned, moral decision” about
whether death is an appropriate punishment. But his reasoning, as he himself states, is based on the claim that weighing is not an end under the
Kansas statute, but rather, “merely a means to reaching a decision.” Again,
this claim relies on a mischaracterization of the Kansas procedure that directly contradicts the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of how the
statute operates. Weighing is an end under the Kansas formula; there is no
further decision-making step. A finding of equipoise is, as Justice Souter
states, the determining fact of death.
Consequently, Justice Thomas’s statement that a determination of equipoise under the Kansas statute is a “decision for death” does nothing to
satisfy the constitutional demands of individualized sentencing. Instead, it
merely legitimizes what Professor Robert Weisberg, in his 1983 article, Deregulating Death, termed a “choice to be choiceless.” That is, at the very
point when the jury does not find the defendant more deserving of death
than any other generic death-eligible defendant, the Kansas law decrees
death. This is the very antithesis of the reliable, rationally reviewable capital
sentencing decision required under the Eighth Amendment.
Studies done by the Capital Jury Project have shown that jurors in death
penalty cases often seek ways to deny personal moral responsibility for their
sentencing decision. As we documented in our brief, Kansas prosecutors
urge jurors that, under the law, death must be the result if they cannot decide
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whether aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances,
or vice versa. The Court’s decision in Marsh encourages prosecutors to continue the practice. Under these conditions, there is great incentive for
Kansas jurors, at the point of equipoise, to seek refuge from responsibility in
a legal rule that chooses death for them.
Faithfulness to an effort to harmonize the competing constitutional demands of the eligibility (narrowing) and selection (individualized
sentencing) stages of capital decision-making would have required that the
Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh be affirmed. Instead, a majority
of the Supreme Court appears to have retreated from the core constitutional
demand of heightened reliability that, under the Court’s precedents, is integral to the individualized sentencing determination required under the
Eighth Amendment.
It is instructive that constitutional “reliability” is mentioned nowhere in
the majority opinion. And, to the extent Justice Thomas even acknowledges
the Court’s longstanding appreciation for the idea that death is truly “different” from all other punishments, he then debunks the idea entirely by
chastising Justice Souter for arguing that recent death row exonerations provide “new empirical evidence” demonstrating the difference. Justice
Thomas claims instead that “the thrust of our mitigation jurisprudence ends”
with the right to present evidence in mitigation and the obligation of the
sentencer to consider that evidence. As Justice Souter notes, the Court’s
holding “defies decades of precedent aimed at eliminating freakish capital
sentencing in the United States.”
The majority opinion in Marsh closes with a warning that the “logical
consequence” of Justice Souter’s argument against the Kansas statute “is
that the death penalty can only be just in a system that does not permit error.” This charge suggests that the dissent’s insistence on the constitutional
demand for reliability necessarily means that the administration of the death
penalty must be perfect. Therefore, to insist on reliability is, ipso facto, to
call for abolition of the death penalty. It is as if Justice Thomas projected
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Callins—in which his response to the difficulty of harmonizing competing constitutional demands under the Eighth
Amendment was to cease upholding the death penalty in any case—onto
Justice Souter’s dissent in Marsh. The problem is, Justice Souter never
makes that argument. His argument is that the Kansas statute does not comport with the requirement of constitutional reliability in the determination of
whether death is an appropriate punishment in a specific case—that, instead
of minimizing the risk of error, it increases that risk by mandating death
upon a finding of equipoise. In other words, the demands of individualized
sentencing under the Eighth Amendment cannot be met. Harmonization of
the competing constitutional demands at the eligibility and selection stages
is impossible here, not because the demands are inherently irreconcilable,
but because the demands indispensable to the selection decision under the
Eighth Amendment cannot be fulfilled by the terms of the statute.
One can admit, without condoning the mistakes that do occur, and while
striving to minimize the risk that they will occur, that even constitutional

WOODMAN IMPRESSIONS FI PAGINATED.DOC

78

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

10/20/2006 3:50 PM

[Vol. 105:73

procedures are prone to human error. Minimizing the risk of error in capital
sentencing has been a fundamental goal of the Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence since Furman. But in Marsh, instead of enforcing constitutional rules designed to minimize mistakes, a majority of the Supreme Court
retreats from those rules. The Court legitimizes error by approving a capital
sentencing procedure that increases the risk an individual will be sentenced
to death when the evidence does not demonstrate that he or she deserves it.
By its decision in Kansas v. Marsh, a majority of the Court comes perilously close to the position of Justice Scalia, whose answer to the difficulty
of harmonizing demands under the Eighth Amendment is to eliminate the
individualized sentencing requirements from capital sentencing procedures.
The question remaining is whether the majority’s retreat from those requirements in Marsh will have any effect on future capital cases that come
before the Court, or whether—as Justice Stevens sees it—the decision
represents “[n]othing more than an interest in facilitating the imposition of
the death penalty” in Kansas. Stay tuned.

